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TOWARDS A MARKET FOR BANK
SAFETY
Chris Jay Hoofnagle
Imagine shopping for a car in i96o. Safety is important to you.
How do you assess a car's performance in surviving a crash? What tools
were available then to take an informed decision?
The modern consumer of financial services is in a similar position
as the car shopper of the z96os. How does the modern consumer choose a
bank that is relatively safe from identity thieves and other malicious
individuals? Perhaps she chooses the larger institution, because it has
more resources to addressfraud. Or perhaps a smaller institution offers
more protection, because it is more obscure. There is no way to know for
sure, and thus, consumers cannot make an informed decision.
This article attempts to actuate a market for bank safety by
comparing identity theft victim data with government statistics used to
measure the relative size of financial institutions. It envisions a future
when this market incentivizes financial services firms to explicitly
compete to reduce the likelihood that customers will become victims of
identity theft or other frauds. In a world of competition in bank safety,
consumers who put a premium on avoidingfraud could reward the most
proficientfirms with their loyalty.
This article concludes that the available data, while weakened by
several methodological concerns, do show that certain banks, large and
small, have different identity theft footprints. Other discoveries were
made as well. First, if present trends continue, there will be a substantial
upswing in identity theft complaints to the Federal Trade Commission in
2008. Second, over a three-year period, a small group of companies
accounted for almost 5o percent of identity theft incidents. Focusing
interventions on this small group of companies could have a profound
effect on incidence of identity theft. Finally, non-banking institutions,
such as telecommunications companies, have an enormous identity theft
footprint; in our highly dependent credit markets, impostors may be using
these companies as stepping stones for attacks against banks.

I. INTRODUCTION

T

his article explores a controversial idea: is it possible to
create a market for "bank safety?" Here, bank safety refers
to financial institutions' resistance to fraud against its
customers. If such a market existed, with banks competing based
upon objective fraud rate information available to the public,
consumers could make more informed decisions about where to
bank.
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To explore this idea, one must assume that at least some
fraud is within the control of banks. All businesses, of course,
experience some level of fraud. Tolerance for this fraud is
balanced against other competing values, such as the importance
of quickly acquiring new customers and the costs and
inconvenience of preventing the fraud.
Different banks, for reasons not understood by consumers
or regulators, may have different vulnerabilities and varied
ability to avoid and mitigate fraud. Subject to general standards,
banks set their own policies and procedures for credit granting
and customer authentication.
Many banks are products of
mergers and buyouts; for logistical reasons, these institutions may
face more difficult challenges in anti-fraud activities. Larger
banks may have more resources for anti-fraud efforts, but their
very size may also make them attractive to frauds such as
phishing. A bank competing to acquire new customers may
tolerate more risk and thus allow more impostors to obtain
accounts.
To explore the idea of a market for bank safety, three
draft versions of this article were released for comment in 2oo8;
all attracted numerous comments from consumers, security
professionals, and regulators.' This final version incorporates
many suggestions and criticisms made by this community.
A. The Automobile Safety Analogy
This proposal has provoked very strong criticism from the
financial services industry. That industry sees itself as the victim
of identity theft, 2 and indeed, this effort has a "blame the victim"
patina to it. Banks must shoulder the financial burden of many
fraud incidents, and as several commenters argued in reviewing
draft versions of this article, sometimes consumers themselves are

Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Measuring Identity Theft at Top Banks (Version
i.o), BERKELEY CTR. FOR LAW AND TECH., LAW AND TECH. SCHOLARSHIP

No. 44, Feb. 26, 2o08, available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/bclt/lts/44/;
Measuring Identity Theft at Top Banks (Version r.5), Mar. 31, 2008, available
at http:lssrn.com/abstract=i i2951i; Measuring Identity Theft (Version 2. o),
Jun. 26, 2008, available at http:/lssrn.comlabstract=
1152082.
2 See, e.g., Jennifer Lynch, Identity Theft in Cyberspace: Crime Control
Methods and Their Effectiveness in Combating Phishing Attacks, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 259, 260 (2005) ("Identity theft" describes the use of
another individual's personal information for fraudulent purposes).
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viewed as having caused the fraud. For instance, the consumer
may have fallen for a phishing email or have used a weak
password for an account. The following comment was a typical
reaction:
This is like grading Chevrolet on its corporate
ability to avoid having its cars wreck. Sure, they'd
prefer that their vehicles would never be involved
in an accident, but since they aren't driving their
cars (once sold) much less the other vehicles which
may be involved in the accident, it's very tough for
them to improve "their accident" statistics.
Exploring the analogy of automobile safety is useful here.
Although the commenter intended to object to this bank safety
effort, the historical example of the automobile safety movement
and the resulting market for safety is instructive in thinking
about identity theft and other forms of financial fraud. The
metaphor illuminates and supports the idea of a market for bank
safety.
While the commenter is correct in arguing that automobile
manufacturers cannot completely control how people drive, over
the past'5o years, a market for auto safety has emerged. The rate
of traffic fatalities has decreased dramatically, despite the
problem that driver error still causes most accidents.3
When automobile safety captured the attention of
Congress and reformers in the i960s, automakers highlighted the
role of driver behavior and the relatively low rates of equipment
failure in accident causation.4 Because drivers caused most
accidents, automakers reasoned, driver education, rather than
safety or design mandates, was the best solution to address
harm.' General Motors spent less than I% of its bidget relative

U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS (2005), available at
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd- 3 o/NCSA/TSFAnn/TSF2005.pdf.
In
1966, the fatality rate per ioo million vehicle miles traveled was 5.5; in 2005, it

was 1.45.
4 RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED

(Grossman 1965).
I Id. at 252. Chapters seven and eight of Ralph Nader's Unsafe at Any
Speed discuss this debate in detail.
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to profits on safety.6 This exclusive focus on driver behavior
prevented innovations in highway safety.7
A revolution in thinking has since occurred. Driver error
is no longer an excuse to avoid safety and design interventions.
In fact, driver error continues to cause most crashes, but it is
understood in more nuanced ways, and technologies are being
developed to help drivers avoid mistakes.8 Other factors, such as
the influence of alcohol, and the importance of enforcing traffic
laws are now understood as central factors in reducing accidents. 9
Accident avoidance was probably not even considered by
a ig6os consumer seeking a safe car. Recent empirical studies
into vehicle safety have shown that accident avoidance
technology, such as traction control systems, have an enormous
impact in reducing fatality rates. These studies drive regulatory
mandates for safety equipment.10
When accidents do occur, innovations ranging from the
seat belt to the airbag reduce harm. The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration administers dozens of standards
for crash avoidance and crashworthiness of cars," and consumers
can obtain crash safety and rollover information online."
Automakers such as Volvo have tied their brand name to vehicle
safety, 3 and sophisticated safety equipment is available even in
less expensive cars. 4 This is all evidence of a vigorous market for
6

Id. at 253-54.
Brian O'Neill, Highway Safety in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CONSUMER

MOVEMENT at 298 (Stephen Brobeck ed., ABC-CLIO 1997).
8 RESEARCH
AND
INNOVATIVE
TECHNOLOGY
ADMINISTRATION,

REDUCING MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES WITH THE DOT'S INTELLIGENT
VEHICLE INITIATIVE, (May-June 2002), available at http://www.volpe.dot.gov/

infosrc/highlts/o2/mayjune/d focus.html.
I O'Neill, supra note 7 at 297-99.
10Laura Meckler, New Car-Safety Focus: Crash Prevention - Regulators
to Propose That All Vehicles Include Stability Control; Weighing Warning
Systems, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2006 at Di.
n NAT'L

HIGHWAY TRAFFIC

SAFETY

ADMIN.,

SAFETY ASSURANCE,

available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/import/FMVSS/index.html.
12 See

NAT'L

HIGHWAY

TRAFFIC

SAFETY

ADMIN.,

SAFERCAR.GOV,

available at http://www.safercar.gov.
13 See

Volvo,

The

Volvo

Saved

My

Life

Club,

available

at

http://www.volvocars.com/us/footer/aboutVolvoSavedMyLifeClub/Pages/def
ault.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2008) (Volvo operates a "The Volvo Saved My
Life Club" online).
14 Jonathan Welsh, Cheaper Cars Move to Top Of Safety List - Insurers
Give Highest Rating To 9 Vehicles Under $30,000; Kia and Hyundai Join
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automobile safety, a market that could not have developed if the
debate did not transcend simply blaming the driver for errors.
Many parallels exist between automobile safety and bank
safety. Financial services firms conceive of the problem as one
caused by consumer error, just as automobile manufacturers
attributed accidents to driver error.
Consumers completely
lacked safety information on cars in the I96os; today the modern
individual lacks reliable methods to understand risk of identity
theft at firms.
Bank safety may yield new discoveries.
Recall that
traction control plays an important role in reducing highway
fatalities, and now the role of alcohol in accidents is more clearly
established. Better tools to evaluate and track fraud at banks
over time may elucidate effective interventions.
It is unlikely that a robust market for bank safety will
emerge on its own. While some institutions advertise that they
are more resistant to fraud or that they fully recompense victims
for losses; these are mere advertising representations. These
institutions do not provide consumers with any objective means
of distinguishing banks nor are their claims verifiable in any
meaningful way.15
Politically, fostering a market for bank safety is not on the
regulatory or legislative horizon. Thus, this effort seeks to find
proxies for regulatory reporting requirements by banks. The
Freedom of Information Act was employed to obtain data about
identity theft from the complaint data submitted by victims from
2006 to 2008 to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). This
complaint data identify the institution where impostors
established fraudulent accounts or affected existing accounts in
the name of the victim. The names of institutions from these
complaints were aggregated and used to rank institutions
Mercedes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2006 at Di.
S In earlier work, the author argued that to address these problems,
lending institutions should publicly report basic statistical information about
identity theft events. In the UK, a basic fraud statistics-reporting network
already exists. That system could be improved upon by reporting the number
of identity theft events suffered or avoided, the form of identity theft
attempted, and the product targeted (e.g., mortgage loan or credit card); and
the amount of loss suffered or avoided. With reporting, consumers, regulators,
and businesses could more accurately assess the identity theft problem and
respond appropriately. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Identity Theft: Making the
Known Unknowns Known, 21 HARV. J. L. TECH. 97 (2007).
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employing publicly
concerning banks.

available

and

proprietary

statistics

II. METHODS
Measuring the incidence and relative rates of identity theft
among firms presents several methodological challenges. This
section explains the FTC consumer victim data, the statistical
data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
and proprietary data that are used to compare the size of
These limitations affect the quality of rate
institutions.
comparisons among institutions, and must be carefully
considered before strong conclusions are made concerning firms'
efficacy in preventing fraud.
A. The FTC Consumer Complaint Data
The FTC holds the largest database of information
concerning identity theft. The FTC collects information from
identity theft victims by phone and through an online form.16 In
doing so, the FTC requests that victims: "Please identify
companies or organizations where fraudulent accounts were
established or your current accounts were affected. ..17 In the
form used to process this data, victims are asked to identify up to
three companies where accounts were established or affected.
While the FTC performs an annual analysis of this complaint
data, the agency does not publicize the names of institutions
identified by victims.1 8 The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
was used to request this data, along with additional, nonpersonally identifiable information provided by victims.
The request for 2006 data resulted in negotiation with the
FTC on the scope and amount of records requested. The original

16

The data in this article were collected before the FTC upgraded the

FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC COMPLAINT
consumer complaint system.
ASSISTANT, available at https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov/ (last visited
Nov. 13, 2008).
"7See FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMPLAINT INPUT FORM, available at
https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov/ (click on "FTC Complaint Assistant").
18 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, CONSUMER FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT
COMPLAINT DATA, JANUARY - DECEMBER 2007 (Feb. 2oo8), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2o08/02/fraud.pdf.
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request sought two years of data, but in light of the burden upon
the FTC's disclosure office to review and release hundreds of
thousands of complaints (the FTC received 674,354 complaints in
2006; 246,035 were identity theft related 9 ), the request was
limited to three randomly-chosen months: January, March, and
September. The request for 2007 data was narrower in that it
only sought institutions' names and the type of identity theft
crime committed in three months of 2007. Data released from
February, May, and December 2007 were comprised of 83,951
unique records, with 48,247 of those records identifying specific
institutions associated with the crime (the FTC received 813,899
complaints in 2007; 258,457 were identity theft related 0 ). Data
released for 2008 covered the months of January, March, and
May, and were comprised of 103,251 unique records, with 62,623
where the consumer victim named an institution. Table i
presents a summary of these disclosures.

19FED. TRADE COMM'N, CONSUMER FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT
COMPLAINT DATA, JANUARY - DECEMBER 2006 (Feb. 2007), available at

[hereinafter
http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/pubs/TopIoFraud2oo6.pdf
FTC 2oo6] (the FTC received 674,354 complaints in 2006. Of those, 246,035
were related to identity theft).
20 Id.
(the FTC received 813,899 complaints in 2007; 258,457 were related
to identity theft).
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TABLE I:

163

FTC CONSUMER VICTIM COMPLAINT DATA

Month

Total Number of

Number of

Complaint

Complaints

Institutions

Complaints

Submitted by

Obtained

Named in

Received by the

Complaints

FTC

Victim

January-o6

29945

16582

March-o6

33161

16168

September-o6

25454

13512

Total 2006

88560

46262

February-o7

3o634

15415

May-07

2781,

16577

December-07

25506

16255

Total 2007

83951

48247

January-o8

34318

.21836

March-o8

39264

22594

May-o8

29669

18193

Total 2008

103251

62623

Grand Total

275762

157112

Total Number of

246035

258457

Data not yet
available

Simply reviewing the number of complaints reveals that,
if present trends continue, there will be a major upswing in
reports of identity theft to the FTC in 20o8. In the three months
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sampled in 2oo8, each had thousands more complaints than the
same month in previous years. Overall, the 2008 disclosures
contained far more complaints, and identify more institutions.
Once the data were obtained, all the responses from the
three company fields were concatenated. Moreover, blank rows,
extraneous data (obvious errors, such as zip codes), and rows
containing content such as "unknown" or "not provided" were
eliminated.
The data were adjusted where inconsistent or
misspelled names were used (e.g., Wallmart, Citybank, Bank of
American), combined where companies that were merged but
nevertheless were identified as separate companies by consumers
(e.g., AT&T Wireless and Cingular, JP Morgan and Chase), and
consolidated when corporate names were merged with a specific
product (e.g., "Citibank Visa" became "Citibank").
Institutions were then ranked in order from high to low by
number of fraud events. This means that the number of fraud
events is counted differently than complaints. In fact, it is
common for a single identity theft complaint to describe several
events of fraud, and several institutions involved in the fraud.
Therefore, for purposes of this article, any mention of a company
name (each complaint allows victims to enter up to three) is an
event that was counted for purpose of calculating the overall
number and relative rate of identity theft.
Several weaknesses must be considered in evaluating the
ranking of institutions. First, the FTC has found that "Most
victims of ID Theft do not report the crime to criminal
authorities."2 1 Based on a telephonic survey, the FTC estimates
that 8.3 million Americans were victims of identity theft in
2005,22 yet only 255,613 complaints of identity theft were filed
with the agency that year. 23 This means that less than one in
thirty-two victims take the time to file a complaint. This fact has
several implications; it could mean that the consumer
complainants are particularly vigilant, interested in redress, or
that they have experienced particularly severe incidents.
Second, other forms of identity theft may go unmeasured,
because consumers do not perceive that the crime occurred.
21 FED. TRADE COMM'N, IDENTITY

THEFT SURVEY REPORT 9 (Sept.

2003), availableat http:l/www.ftc.gov/os/2003/o9/synovatereport.pdf.
22 FED. TRADE COMM'N - IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT at 4 (Nov.

2007), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2007/xi/SynovateFinalReportIDTheft
20o6.pdf [hereinafter FTC THEFT SURVEY].
23 See FTC 2006, supra note i9 at 4.
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"Synthetic identity theft" events, defined by the FTC as,
"Situations in which someone creates *a fictitious identity by
combining personal information from one or more consumers
with invented information, rather than using the identity of an
existing individual, '' 24 may not be reflected by consumer
complaints. This factor, and the low level of consumers who
make complaints even when they are aware of fraud, means that
the data available are from a relatively small minority of identity
theft cases.
Third, several factors complicate victims' identification of
institutions. The FTC's identity theft complaint form is lengthy
Victims identify
and takes substantial time to complete."
institutions near the end of the form, when they may be fatigued
or hurried to complete the task of submitting the complaint.
Consumer victims may misidentify a bank, as some have similar
names or use neologisms that are difficult for individuals to spell.
Consumers also may use the same name to represent different
legal entities or products. For instance, a victim submitting
"AT&T" might intend to mean AT&T wireless, long distance
service, internet service, or even an AT&T-branded credit card.
This means that a ranking of incidents concerning very large
institutions with multiple product lines can become confusing,
because such institutions may actually have a low level of fraud
in the banking context, but appear to have high levels of fraud as
a result of complaints concerning other product lines.
Betsy Broder, the Assistant Director of the Federal Trade
Commission's Division of Privacy and Identity Protection,
commenting on previous versions of this article, amplified the
above-mentioned challenges: "Complaint data may contain errors
and may not correctly identify the company that is associated
with the identity theft. 2 6 Broder concluded that this and other
limits of the FTC data fundamentally weaken the effort:

24
21

See FTC THEFT SURVEY, supra note 2 2.
See FTC Complaint Assistant, supra note

I7.

The FTC's new

complaint system collects information about the institution name earlier in the
process, but the complaint process is still lengthy.
26 Letter from Betsy Broder, Assistant Director, Div. of Privacy and
Identity Protection, FTC, to Chris Hoofnagle, Senior Fellow, Berkeley Ctr. for
Law & Tech. (Mar. 6. 2o08), available at https://webfiles.berkeley.edu/choof
nagle/publichtml/Chris%2oHoofnagle%2oLetter.pdf.
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I am concerned that some readers of the report
and, more likely, readers of the press accounts
about it, will ignore the caveats in your report
and place great weight on its findings than is
warranted. In addition to the questions about
the underlying data as described above, we
believe it would be erroneous to extrapolate from
the complaints that the companies with the
highest number of complaints were either greater
sources of data breaches or had especially lax
procedures for opening new accounts.
Broder's objection is a serious one, but this effort does not make
conclusions concerning security breaches or the particular
problem of. lax practices. The relationship between security
breaches and identity theft is not analyzed here. 28 Furthermore,
this analysis cannot and does not directly answer the question of
whether a specific company has lax procedures for opening new
accounts.29
Creating a market for bank safety is an iterative process,
Much like the
one that will require coAtinual tuning.
appreciation for the complexity of auto safety has progressed over
time, our understanding of identity theft risk is likely to evolve as
well. The fact that some will misinterpret the effort to measure
identity theft is not a compelling reason for ending this inquiry.
Returning to an earlier theme, a Bank of America
spokesperson remarked that institutions named in a consumer
complaint may not have caused the fraud:

Id.
For a discussion of this issue, see Sasha Romanosky, Rahul Telang &
Alessandro Acquisti, Do Data Breach DisclosureLaws Reduce Identity Theft?,
Carnegie Mellon Univ., (Sept. i6, 2oo8), available at http://ssrn.com/
27

28

abstract= 1268926.

29 See Letter from Broder, supra note 26. Broder suggested a second
weakness in using the FTC data to rank institutions: "Some companies take
special efforts to direct consumers to the FTC's complaint system,"
accordingly, these institutions "may have a disproportionate number of
complaints" in the database. This objection is weakened substantially by the
fact that the complaint data described by Broder is coded so that the
institutions' identities are masked. As a result, institution-provided data have
not been included in this analysis.
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Bank of America spokeswoman Betty Riess says the
company hasn't seen the study yet, but says BoA
takes security seriously. "Keep in mind that if we
have a customer who reports they are a victim of
identity theft that doesn't correlate to security at
BoA," Riess said, referring to the fact that a BoA
customer experiencing identity theft could have had
their mail stolen or fallen prey to a phishing attack.
"Protecting customer information is a top priority at
BoA and we have multiple layers of security." Riess
added that BoA uses online security offerings from
RSA and lets customers use one-time credit card
numbers for purchases from unfamiliar online
retailers.3"
Riess and others3' often invoked phishing as an example of
a situation where the consumer's mistake resulted in identity
theft. As noted in the introduction, some of the most strenuous
objections to earlier drafts of this analysis came from bank
security officers frustrated with individuals' inability to recognize
phishing attacks. This objection to the analysis is myopic. While
phishing has imposed substantial costs on online banking, other
types of attacks dominate the FTC consumer complaint data.
The FTC's analysis of the identity theft complaint data shows
that victims suffered a variety of identity-related frauds, a high
percentage of which were attacks that established new accounts.32
Further, as explained in the introduction, one of the
assumptions of this effort is that fraud events can be shaped by
institutions' policies.33 In the phishing context, a market for bank
30 Ryan Singel, Bank of America, HSBC Most Prone to I.D. Theft, Report
Says-Updated, WIRED, Feb. 27, 2oo8, available at http://blog.wired.com/
2 7bstroke6/2oo8/02/bank-of-america.html.
31 See, e.g., Harry Calamari commenting that "nearly all information
breaches are most often due to the negligence of the consumer..." on More
Accurate Identity Theft Reporting By Banks: The Opening Salvo, Bank
Lawyer's Blog, Mar. 9, 2oo8, available at http://www.banklawyersblog.com/
3_bank lawyers/2oo8/03/more-accurate-i.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
32

See FTC 2006, supra note I9, at 13.

In a December 2007 workshop on Social Security Numbers held by the
Federal Trade Commission, Trey French of Bank of America stated that the
bank approved about 14 million credit applications a year mostly through a
completely automated process, meaning that the institution had no human
review of this account granting. Tramond French, Vice President, Bank of
31
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safety may reveal that some institutions have incorporated
designs and technologies that are better at helping consumers
recognize and avoid fraud. In other contexts, however, events
are clearly the fault of the institution." For instance, Riess argued
that mail theft is outside the bank's control, but one of the
principal reasons mail is stolen is to intercept bank-initiative
marketing communications, such as pre-approved credit offers
and convenience checks.
Almost eight billion of these
solicitations are sent annually," each offering a chance for
impostors to open new accounts.3 6 Banks certainly are in control
of sending these offers; and the more sent, the larger an attack
surface is created for fraud.
B. Data Used to Compare Institutions
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
maintains statistics on financial institutions in the Statistics on
America, Remarks at Security in Numbers, SSNs and ID Theft, Federal Trade
Commission Workshop (Dec. io, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp
workshops/ssn/index.shtml. An institution that decides to do such a thing will
have a different identity theft footprint than other banks.
" See, e.g., Wolfe v. MBNA Am. Bank, 485 F. Supp. 2d 874 (W.D. Tenn.
2007) (permitting negligence claim against defendant bank to continue under
Tennessee law where a fraudulent credit application was accepted despite
having a false address, phone number, and mother's maiden name); see also
Hoofnagle, Identify Theft, supra note 15 (showing that it is possible to
manufacture !'synthetic" identities using real Social Security numbers (SSNs)
and fake names in order to obtain credit, suggesting that some institutions do
not even match SSNs to the applicant's name; see also Brian Krebs, The FDIC
Computer Intrusion Report, WASH. POST., Nov. 9, 2007, available at
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2oo8/o3/thefdiccomputer-intru
sion re.html.
" Julia Spencer, Card Mail, Cardtrak.com, Feb. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.cardtrak.com/news/2007/02/2i/cardmail.
36 See, e.g., Bob Sullivan, Even torn-up credit card applications aren't safe,
MSNBC, Mar.

14,

2006, available at http://redtape.msnbc.com/2oo6/o3/

whatif a despe.html; Identity thievesfeed on creditfirms' lax practices, USA
TODAY, Sept. 12, 2003, p. iiA; Kevin Hoffman, Lerner's Legacy: MBNA's
customers wouldn't write such flattering obituaries,CLEVELAND SCENE, Dec.
I8, 2002; Scott Barancik, A Week in Bankruptcy Court, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2002, at 8E. The lax standards associated with new account
openings with prescreened offers are illustrated by cases where accounts have
been opened in the name of dogs. See, e.g., Dog Gets Carded, WASH. TIMES
(Jan. 30, 2004); Dog Issued Credit Card, Owner Sends In Pre-Approved
Application As Joke, NBC San Diego (Jan. 28, 2004).
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Depository Institutions (SDI) database."
The data are drawn
from the Federal Financial Institution Examination Council Call
Reports (a regular statement on a bank's condition), and from the
Office of Thrift Supervision.3" SDI was used to generate reports
on the comparative size of banks using two different measures.
The first measure captures the likely number of consumer
accounts that an institution has, the other describes the total
amount deposited in these accounts.
First, "Number of deposit accounts of $ioo,ooo or less," is
a SDI figure that is offered annually in the June Call Report. It is
defined as, "Number of deposit accounts of $ioo,ooo or less held
39
in domestic offices.
Second, "Deposit accounts of $ioo,ooo or less," is a SDI
figure defined as "Amount of deposit accounts of $ioo,ooo or less
held in domestic offices and in insured branches in Puerto Rico
and U.S. territories and possessions."40
These measures are intended to focus on a bank's
consumer base. Other measures, such as Total Deposits, would
include accounts over $ioo,ooo that are more likely held for
business customers. Those measures allow banks with large
commercial practices to appear to perform better than smaller
banks lacking corporate-oriented accounts.
In addition to the FDIC measures, the Nilson Report
offers a ranking of credit card issuers by volume of cash advances
and purchases made. Nilson Report data is used to rate the top
io credit card issuers by volume. This measure should more
fairly portray institutions such as American Express and other
major credit card issuers that have a small depository account
footprint, but very large risk exposure because of the prevalence
of credit card fraud. It should be noted that the Nilson Report's
data is proprietary and its sources are not always clearly stated.
The publication claims to be, "The world's leading source of
news and proprietary research on consumer payment systems."4'1

37 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., STATISTICS ON DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS,

Feb.

available at http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp.

15, 2oo8,
38 FED. DEPOSIT

INS. CORP., DISCLAIMER AND NOTES, Feb.

15,

2008,

available at http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/disclaimer.asp.
39 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., Definitions, Feb. 15, 2008, available at
http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/sitemap-rpt.asp?DRSLineLevel= I4.
40

Id.

41See

Nilson Report, available at http://nilsonreport.com/.
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Since 2o8 data are not yet available, 2007 data are substituted to
compare major credit card companies in 2008.
C. Challenges Comparing Non-FinancialServices Institutions
Financial services institutions are subject to a range of
regulatory requirements, including the regular reporting
described above.
Few other industries are subject to such
reporting, and this presents a challenge for comparing nonbanking institutions that rank high in identity theft complaints.
In particular, telecommunications companies ranked highly in
overall events, but their relative rates of fraud are not compared
here because up to date and reliable statistics on the number of
accounts (and their types) among telecommunications companies
are not available.
III. COMPARISONS AND DISCUSSION
A. Raw Count of Events, 2006-2008
Table 2 on the next page presents the top 25 most
frequently identified institutions by consumers in their
complaints to the FTC in 2008. The average numer of events per
month is calculated from the three months of data obtained from
the FTC in 2006-2008. High standard error indicates that fraud
rates varied greatly from month to month, suggesting that
identity theft has seasonal peaks.
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TABLE 2: AVERAGE EVENTS PER MONTH AMONG INSTITUTIONS
MOST FREQUENTLY NAMED IN FTC CONSUMER COMPLAINTS IN
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From year to year, the "top 25" group of companies
remains relatively constant. From 2006-2007, Home Depot, the
Internal Revenue Service, and JC Penney were added to the top
25 list, while Walmart (dropped to 29), Dish Network (dropped to
41), and Bellsouth (merged with AT&T) fell outside the top 25.
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From 2007-2oo8, Dish Network reappeared in the top 25, while
eBay dropped to 31.

This constancy among the top 25 is important because this
small cohort is named in almost half of identity theft events.
0.49%
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Over this three year period, covering I5O,ooo complaints, the top
25 (as of 2008) accounted for 48.4% of cases in 2006, 49.8% in
2007, and 47.3% in 2008.
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Over these three years, the companies listed accounted for
47-49% of identity theft complaints where the victim named a
company. These data present a clear opportunity for several
modes of regulatory intervention. These interventions could use
an agency's "soft" power. For instance, regulators should provide
outreach to these 25 companies, in order to ensure that they are
aware of the incidence of misuse of personal information
involving their company. The agency could provide expert
assistance in improving practices, and in sharing approaches that
have been used at other institutions. Short of those steps, if a
regulator were simply to express concern about a certain
institution accounting for a non-trivial amount of identity theft, it
would certainly actuate a response.
Other interventions may be appropriate as well. For
instance, regulators could pose as impostors to test these
companies' authentication practices, and help them improve
upon them. Enforcement actions could be brought where these
companies are not following generally accepted security practices.
The FTC and other regulators could profoundly affect this
landscape by simply bringing publicity to this problem. If, as this
paper has done, federal regulators published statistics concerning
incidence of fraud, executives would act quickly to change
practices to address their appearance on the "top 25" list.
Since this small group accounts for so much of the fraud
affecting consumers, a more interventionist agency might
consider requiring this cohort to develop an identity theft
prevention and remediation plan. This plan could be reviewed
by regulators, and would set a clear performance benchmark for
reducing levels of fraud (falling out of the top 25 list).
B. Non-Banking Institutions
i. Retailers
While a market for bank safety focuses on financial
services institutions, this top 25 list indicates that many other
businesses are frequently involved in fraud. In some cases, these
are large, high volume retailers, such as Target and Home Depot.
Executives at these companies may not even be aware that
hundreds of individuals are filing complaints with the FTC every
month concerning fraud at their stores.
Because of the
extraordinary amount of fraud associated with these retailers, it
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would be wise for them to routinely verify the identity of
customers paying with credit cards, and to invest more in widelyavailable new account fraud detection tools.
2.

Telecommunications Companies

All the major telecommunications companies (AT&T,
Verizon, T-Mobile, and Sprint/Nextel) appear in the top 20 of the
ranking. AT&T and Verizon rank as 2 and 3 in 2008; in 2007,
Verizon ranked as number i, having more fraud events than all
banks. Similarly, three television providers, Comcast, DirecTV,
and Dish Network, appear in the top 25 as well.
Clearly, identity theft among
telecommunications
companies is a major, industry-wide problem. But consumer
advocates, the media, and regulators are more focused on the role
of banks in fraud. It is generally believed that banks have better
security
and
authentication
practices
than
the
telecommunications industry.
These statistics suggest that
impostors are exploiting a different level of care used in this
specially-regulated industry.
Identity theft at telecommunications companies presents
substantial risk to other actors in our highly interdependent
credit authentication system.
Once a telecommunications
account is established, that fact is used both as an identifier and
authenticator among financial institutions when deciding
whether to issue new lines of credit. This presents risk because
impostors can leverage fraudulent telecommunications accounts
in order to commit larger-scale, traditional financial identity
theft.
3. Collections Agencies
AFNI, a collections agency, was named by victims in
between .85% and 4.45% of all identity theft complaints from
2006-2008. This indicates that consumers are confused about the
role of collections agencies. Assuming companies are acting in
good faith, when they turn over an account for collections; the
belief is the account is legitimate and the customer is simply a
deadbeat. The collections agency then contacts the putative
accountholder and that person claims that the account is
fraudulent. Consumers are confused by this process, and in large
numbers, they are making complaints to the FTC, where they
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identify the collections agency, rather than the company at which
the account was actually established.
This offers another opportunity for intervention:
authorities could require collections agencies to act differently
when collecting on behalf of a client with a large number of
fraudulent accounts. The collections agency could request that
the client rereview delinquent accounts for fraud before collecting
on them, in order to save consumers the inconvenience of a debt
collection call and derogatory notations on their credit files.
4. The Internal Revenue Service
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) accounted for .03% of
fraud in 2006, .74%.in 2007, and 2.19% in 20o8. This precipitous
rise is reflected in the poplar media, and in April 2008, the
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration reported that
to take extra measures to shield citizens from
the IRS needed
42
identity theft.
IV. COMPARATIVE RANKINGS

A. Number of Accounts
Table 3 compares how the largest 25 banks (total deposits,
2008) compare on fraud events, using the number of deposit
accounts under $ioo,ooo metric. This metric was used because
most consumer accounts are likely to have under $ioo,ooo. A
total deposit figure could be misleading, because accounts over
$ioo,ooo may be held by large, corporate clients.

42

DEP'T OF THE TREAS.,

TIGTA

REPORT CONCLUDES THAT

IRS

NEEDS

TO Do MORE TO COMBAT IDENTITY THEFT, Apr. 9, 2o8, available at

http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/press/press-o4o92 oo8.htm.
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Under this metric, large institutions
accounts have relatively high rates
expected, because these companies
depository base. For that reason, this
comparing institutions with a mix of
deposit accounts.

that focus on credit card
of fraud, which is to be
do not have a strong
metric is more effective in
credit card and consumer
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B. Volume of Smaller Accounts
Table 4 compares how the largest 25 banks (total deposits,
compare on fraud events, based upon how much is
deposited in smaller accounts. Table 4 uses a metric that capture
the amount of money deposited in small accounts.
2008)

TABLE 4: EVENTS PER VOLUME OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS UNDER
$100,000, 2006-2008
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The largest U.S. banks, JP Morgan Chase, Citibank, and Bank of
America, appear in the overall top 25, and are second only to
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large, credit-card heavy firms in the comparative charts. This
observation attracted strong criticism in earlier versions of this
article. Several remarked that this finding simply stated the
obvious: larger banks were bigger targets of scammers, and thus
one should expect larger institutions to fare worse on identity
theft. This statement was perhaps best expressed by Patrik
Jonsson, who reported that "...many banks say the Hoofnagle
study simply told people what they already knew-that the
'43
biggest banks are going to have the most problems with fraud.
This assumption that larger banks have bigger fraud
problems is not obvious, and probably contradicts many
consumers' expectations. It would be perfectly rational for a
consumer to assume that a big, reputable bank has more
sophisticated systems and more intense investment in security
systems than a smaller bank or credit union, and therefore
conclude that larger institutions are harder to attack. This
assumption also contradicts some of the promises underlying the
recent laws that allow permissive information sharing among
bank affiliates. Proponents of information sharing argued that
more opportunities to share personal information would help in
identifying and fighting fraud.44 Combined, these factors may
lead individuals to believe that bigger banks are Safer.
These data, however, enable the consumer to choose very
large banks that still perform relatively well. For instance,
Wachovia, the fourth largest US bank, appears in the overall top
25 list, but performs much better than the largest banks on
comparative measures of fraud. These data also show that
relatively smaller banks, such as PNC and ING, have
dramatically lower incidents and rates of fraud.
A safety
sensitive consumer may use these banks to avoid the
inconvenience and harm of identity theft.

43 Patrik

Jonsson, New Identity Theft Study Meets Mixed Reviews, Bank
Info Security, Mar. 17, 2oo8, available at http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/
p-print.php?t=a&id=755.
44 See,

e.g.,

COMMENT,

95404.pdf.

GLBA

INFORMATION SHARING STUDY

available at

www.ots.treas.gov/docs/r.cfm?

WELLS FARGO BANK,

Apr.

23,

2002,
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C. Comparison of the Largest Credit CardIssuers by Volume
The measures used thus far do not fairly account for
identity theft among credit card issuers. Major issuers often have
a small depository base, and thus appear to have very high rates
of fraud compared to institutions with a mix of financial services
products, or no credit cards offerings at all.
In order to more meaningfully compare major credit card
issuers, Nilson Report's data on the volume of purchases and
cash advances was used. To make a comparison concerning 2008
events, 2007 volume data were used, because this year's data is
not yet available.
TABLE 6: EVENTS PER VOLUME OF SALES AMONG MAJOR
CREDIT CARD ISSUERS, 2006-2008
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Perhaps not surprisingly, despite processing an enormous
volume of transactions, American Express had the lowest rate of
complaints among the largest credit card issuers. American
Express has a different threat exposure, because of its focus on
business expense accounts and control over issuing practices. It
is also possible that the company's focus on customer service
causes consumer victims to forgo making complaints to the FTC.
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V. CONCLUSION

Those who are interested in avoiding identity theft and
other financial fraud are in a similar position today as the safety
conscious automobile shopper was in the i96os. Since the ig6os,
the automobile safety movement, which involved a range of
interventions including providing consumers objective data
about safety, sparked a vigorous market for safety, identified new
technologies, and elucidated public policy alternatives that
enhanced highway safety. Today, even inexpensive cars have
sophisticated safety technology, and the safety-conscious
consumer has more information and choices in automobile
purchasing.
This article seeks to actuate a similar market for bank
safety. Such a market would provide accurate, objective
statistics about fraud to consumers, regulators, and other
businesses. With this fraud data, consumers who place a high
value on avoiding identity theft and similar inconveniences could
choose institutions with the lowest fraud risk. To date, a safety
sensitive consumer may assume that a large bank is a good
choice, but this article shows that the picture is more complex:
the largest institutions have very high levels of fraud events, even
when controlling for the number and size of accounts. Some
smaller institutions, which consumers may assume to be less
sophisticated and less resourced to address fraud, actually have
very low overall events and relative rates of identity theft.
Just as the automobile safety movement elucidated nonobvious factors in highway safety, this effort reveals new
opportunities for interventions that would protect consumers.
For instance, about half of all identity theft events involve a
handful of companies. Federal regulators possess a number of
tools to incentivize this small group to enhance anti-fraud
measures. Finally, fraud is a major problem at non-banking
institutions, and these crimes may be stepping stones to more
serious attacks on financial institutions.
A fully-functioning bank safety market would illuminate
these problems and others, and provide heightened incentives for
identity theft prevention and remediation.

